Marcus Steinweg on Duras the Philosopher

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Location
Walker Cinema
Date
February 7, 2010
When
2:00 PM
Genre
Humanities, Visual Arts
Type
Lecture
Duration
1 hr 28 min 14 sec
People
Marcus Steinweg


Description

Known for his writing on aesthetics, abstraction, and art as well as his collaborations with artists, Marcus Steinweg focuses on a reframing of the late French author Marguerite Duras as a philosopher rather than a writer or filmmaker. This lecture closes artist-in-residence Haegue Yang’s interrogation of Duras’ multidisciplinary oeuvre and threads connections between the author as a philosophical figure and Yang’s work.


Mack Lectures are made possible by generous support from Aaron and Carol Mack.


 

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1 sec
Marcus Steinweg on Duras the Philosopher Sarah Peters: Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Walker Art Center. I am Sarah Peters. I direct public programs here, and I'm happy to see all of you here this afternoon, for today's Mack Lecture. The impetus for the talk this afternoon comes from visual artist Haegue Yang, who occupied this institution as an artist in residence for a month last September, and is now back at the Walker to complete the second phase of her residency. The life and work of Marguerite Duras has been a significant component of her project here. The first phase of the residency took the form of a seminar, during which Haegue and several Walker staff members and local artists and scholars met nine times over the course of three weeks to discuss subjects of interest to Haegue, and focused several sessions on Marguerite Duras.
51 sec
Haegue's continuing desire to thoroughly analyze the artistic and intellectual achievements of the late French author motivated her return this month and the organization of a multifaceted public program on Duras that includes today's talk and our film series of works by Duras that's been screening since Thursday and concludes this afternoon with the screening of "Natalie Granger" at 4:00 PM here in the Cinema.
1 min 17 sec
There is much scholarship on Duras as a writer, a complex political provocateur, and a maker of cinema and theater. But today, we will tune in to a different channel, to consider her as a philosopher.
1 min 30 sec
This re-visioning of Duras is the thinking of Marcus Steinweg, whom I am happy to introduce as today's speaker. He joins us from his home in Berlin, where he teaches and writes about the world in the form of philosophy. Of the many subjects that occupy this writing and publishing, the meaning of art and its relationship between it and philosophy has a strong hold on his thinking. In a work titled "The Friendship of Art and Philosophy, " he defines both entities separately and then unites them by calling out their common interests.
2 min 1 sec
He addresses this relationship between modes of production of art and philosophy in numerous other lectures and texts, such as "Art, Philosophy, and Politics: What is an Artwork?" "The Subject of Art, " and "Affirmation of Chaos: Art and Philosophy." He has published several books, through the esteemed German publisher Merve Verlag, and has also written on Haegue Yang's work.
2 min 24 sec
This friendship that he speaks of is also found in Steinweg's collaboration with artists. He works frequently with the Swiss artist Thomas Hirschhorn, and together they have produced artworks, texts, and large-scale projects.
2 min 37 sec
As part of Hirschhorn's recent artistic and programmatic installation, the Bijlmer Spinoza Festival, which took place in the Bijlmer neighborhood of Amsterdam in the spring and summer of 2009, Steinweg delivered 50 lectures over the course of the two-month project. The subject of these ruminations are stated clearly in their titles: "Against Narcissism, " or "What Does It Mean to Pay?" And the series was punctuated with a number of talks on philosophers, aptly titled "Why Derrida? " "Why Deleuze? " "Why Duras? " et cetera.
3 min 10 sec
The philosophy of Duras is a territory of thought that Steinweg has explored for the past several years. Many lectures and writings, including a book co-authored with the German conceptual artist Rosemary Trockel, are part of a rigorous recasting of Duras as a philosopher rather than as a novelist, a playwright, a journalist, or as a film director, as we know her.
3 min 34 sec
I want to thank Marcus for traveling so far to share these thoughts of his with us today, and for giving us an opportunity to imagine this familiar yet enigmatic figure in a new way.
3 min 44 sec
Before I invite him up to the stage, I would like to draw your attention to the next talk in the Mack Lecture series, which will be on Saturday, February 27th, at 2:00 in the afternoon, here in the Cinema. Former Walker curator and now curator at Dia Foundation in New York, Yasmil Raymond, will be here in conversation with artists and artist and philosopher Jan Estep, from the University of Minnesota, in a discussion on art and discomfort.
4 min 11 sec
And that's the opening day program for Raymond's new exhibition, Abstract Resistance, which opens on the same day, and borrows its title from a Thomas Hirschhorn work, which will be in the show. So, I believe there's a mention of that in your program notes. Please put that on your calendar. It promises to be another exciting afternoon.
4 min 31 sec
And I'd also like to thank Aaron and Carol Mack for their generous support of these lectures that enables us to offer them for free.
4 min 37 sec
So, with that, please welcome Marcus Steinweg. [applause] Marcus Steinweg: Yes. Thank you. Thanks very much, Sarah. Thank you, Haegue. Thanks, of course, to the Walker for this invitation. The title of my lecture today is, as announced, "The Philosophy of Marguerite Duras." And as you know, and as mentioned already by Sarah, we don't know Marguerite Duras as a philosopher, primordially. Marguerite Duras is a writer.
5 min 16 sec
We know her as a writer. We know her as a playwright, also, and as a filmmaker.
5 min 23 sec
Marguerite Duras was born in 1914, and she died in 1996. And I started to work on her work, let me introduce personally, some years ago, when my publisher, after I made four books with him, he said to me, "Marcus, after you made four books on pure philosophy, why do you don't write a book on Kafka, for example, or on Samuel Beckett?" And my idea immediately was not Kafka, not Samuel Beckett. Of course, I have a huge respect for these authors.
6 min 5 sec
But, immediately, it came in my mind that I read, a long time ago, in the '90s, when this book appeared, when it came out in '93, "Writing", "Architecture" a book published at Gallimard by Marguerite Duras. And at that time, this was the only book I know of her, the only book I read of her. But what I remembered is that what Marguerite Duras calls writing is, in a way, what I call philosophy.
6 min 44 sec
So this lecture on the philosophy of Marguerite Duras is about the question, what is philosophy, in general? And what is, of course, a philosopher? Every philosopher gives and presents and invents its own concept of philosophy, like every artist is inventing, generating its own concept of art. And Marguerite Duras did the same with writing. She invented her own concept of literature. And she does not say "literature." And I come back to this difference.
7 min 23 sec
She makes a difference between making literature and writing. So, the philosophy of Marguerite Duras has to deal with the question: what does it mean to write in the sense that Marguerite Duras gave to this notion, to this dynamics, to this procedure, of writing? So what does it mean to write? What is writing? So, for me, it's, of course, a very subjective access to the work of Marguerite Duras that I want to present you today. My question, always, is, I don't insist so much in my work, even if I work with artists--or because maybe this is the only way for me to work with artists, like with Thomas Hirschhorn, like with Rosemary Trockel, for example. We wrote this book together, or we made this book together, on Marguerite Duras. And for me, it's important to insist on the difference of approach, the difference of access, the difference to a work like the work of Duras.
8 min 31 sec
But then, I think my question is, art and philosophy, for example, and then writing, what do they share? What might they share? What might they have in common? So, for me, philosophy is not simply an academic procedure, like it exists in the academic sphere, at the university, at the different philosophical departments at universities. So the academic concept of philosophy, in a way, is so much about writing books on someone who is writing books. So you have the problem of the communication between books. And I don't agree with this idea of philosophy, with this reduction of philosophy to a kind of academic procedure.
9 min 23 sec
But of course, it makes part of the philosophical work--for example, there's a historical part of the work of this philosopher.
9 min 35 sec
So, also, for me, it's important to know, as good as I can, to the history of philosophy, let's say the more than 2500 years of occidental philosophy at least, to read the important texts, to read the authors, so to orientate myself within this already existing field, the field of so-called philosophy.
10 min 3 sec
This is the one thing. The other thing is, of course, that, as you know, each philosopher of this tradition, like let's say Descartes or Kant or Hegel or Heidegger or Deleuze, each of these philosophers invented its own concept of philosophy, its own style of writing, its own language. And so, I think, here you can find a kind of proximity between the work of a philosopher and the work of an artist, because, also, the philosopher is dealing with the question to invent something, a new form, a new form of writing, a new vocabulary, new concepts. This was, like you might know, the definition that Gilles Deleuze gave of philosophy -- philosophy is about the creation of new concepts.
11 min 1 sec
So, why? Because philosophy is not only an academic procedure. It is a procedure that has to do with the invention of something new.
11 min 12 sec
This is something Deleuze insisted on. And I quite agree with this idea of philosophy as a procedure of the invention of something new, where, of course, in the field of already existing reality, and this existing reality field, the world we share, the over- determined, the socially, politically, historically, over- determined, over-codified world, the so-called reality space, I call it the texture of facts.
11 min 51 sec
The precise function of this notion of reality, or the notion of facts, or the notion of how I call it the universe of facts, or the texture of facts, the precise function, of course, is -- how do you say it in English? -- to suppose a kind of stability, a kind of ontological stability, a kind of ontological consistency of this field.
12 min 16 sec
So, when we speak about reality, we have in mind that there is a kind of stability. What is real is not, at the same time, not real.
12 min 27 sec
But of course, philosophy is dealing with the very thin, invisible line, if you want, the very thin, invisible difference between these two orders: the order of so-called reality, and a second order, a second order that is not indicating a second world, a pre- given second world, like a religious or theological beyond, a life after this life and the here and now.
12 min 59 sec
So my claim, of course, is, in this artist's horizon of the thinking of the whole 20th century, God is dead, that this principal claim of Nietzsche is like a huge shadow affecting, this kind of shadow, the philosophy, very different positions of the philosophy of the 20th century. And if God is dead, then there is no preexisting. There is no given. There is no positively given second world or second order. So there's no transcendence, in that sense.
13 min 47 sec
And the philosophy vocabulary makes this difference between the thinking of eminence like, for example, the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, and a thinking of eminence that is reacting. Deleuze wrote two books on Nietzsche, is very influenced by Nietzsche and is developing its own thinking with Nietzsche, and of course, developing in its own way.
14 min 14 sec
But this idea of the philosophy of eminence has, maybe, to be complicated. I feel quite close to Gilles Deleuze. There is no transcendence. There is no God. There is no second world order.
14 min 28 sec
There is no given beyond. There is no transcendence, in this sense. But, if you insist on a pure eminence, it would be simply the other side of the same coin. And I would say the phantasm of a pure eminence is as metaphysical as the phantasm of a pre-given transcendence.
14 min 55 sec
So, what is the ontological structure of this reality field in which the philosophy is done, or in which philosophy is important, or gets kind of important--thinking, or art, and writing, later, with Duras? And I would say the ontological structure of the so- called world, or the so-called reality system, is there is no beyond. There is this field of established consistencies, this field in which a lot of different opinions, a lot of different thoughts, a lot of different ideas, of course, are circulating, concerning the consistency of this consistency field, reality.
15 min 49 sec
But, when we say reality, we believe in a minimum of consistency. We believe that there is a kind of stable ground. There is a kind of security. We live in this world, in this hyper-codified or hyper -determined world, like in a kind of secured zone. We have the feeling that there is a kind of orientation. There is a kind of stability. We wouldn't be able to live our everyday life if every second of our life, every minute of our life, every day, we would have to interrogate the ontological stability of the world we live in, or of this reality field we live in. So we need a kind of trust in the ontological stability, or the ontological consistency, of this reality field.
16 min 50 sec
What is philosophy, if not interrogating this trust? Not saying that it does not make sense to trust. This trust has, of course, a precise function.
17 min 1 sec
And let me remember the writings of the late Ludwig Wittgenstein, this philosopher who wrote a very, very beautiful book, one of the most beautiful books, I would say, of the philosophy of the 20th century. It's "ber Gewiheit," "On Certainty, " a very small book, a book that is collecting the last notes of Wittgenstein. And he continued writing on these notes, I think, until some days before he died, at the beginning of the '50s.
17 min 45 sec
And one of the crucial claims of these notes, of this book, is that there is a necessity to trust, to trust in the consistency of our world. There is a necessity to trust in something that is not guaranteed by a kind of universal horizon -- call it God -- or a universal, transcendental, superior authority. Call it God, or call it, with Jacques Lacan if you want, the Symbolic Order.
18 min 28 sec
The Symbolic Order is the Lacanian term for the logos system, for, you can say, the universe of language, the universe of information, the universe of sense, the universe of established meaning. And we need the feeling of the kind of consistency of this universe. We need the trust in everyday communication. We need the feeling that this communication is not failing permanently.
19 min 5 sec
But of course, there is a kind of inconsistency that marks the ontological character of this consistency field that we call reality, of this universe of facts. And I would say philosophy, in general, was always this: to interrogate the so-called consistency of this texture of facts.
19 min 29 sec
Here, I would say, there's something like a friendship. You can remark on a kind of friendship between philosophy and art. Because to make art... Like I said about philosophy, if the philosophy is inventing its own concepts - its own concept, for example, of what philosophy is, its own idea of what philosophy is within this field of established realities - then I would say an artist is someone who is inventing its own forms.
20 min 6 sec
Of course, also, its own concept by doing this, its own concept of art within this, by confronting the inherent, or the implicit, formlessness of the universe effects. The universe effects can be perceived in two different perspectives. First, of course, is the universe of stability, a kind of stable ground. Then, in a second perspective, there's the very inconsistency of this field.
20 min 41 sec
One of the crucial notions, or words, that Duras is dealing with in her whole work is the hole. The hole is, of course, a perforation of the ground. The hole marks a kind of contact of the ground with the abyss, with a kind of ontological abyss. Of course, we can give different names to this abyss. The abyss is, of course, the abyss of incommensurability. It is the abyss of an ontological instability.
21 min 20 sec
It is in, for example, the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattary, in this famous book, especially, "What is Philosophy?" from the beginning of the '90s. It is the abyss of [indecipherable 21:34]. So this ontological structure of the abyss, or the hole, or incommensurability, these are in a way synonyms for what I called before the very inconsistency of this consistency field that is reality.
21 min 56 sec
This is why I speak about the friendship between philosophy and art, because even if, of course, each artist is expressing itself in a different way... For example, one is using this medium, and the other this one. One is working more conceptually, if you want, and the other one is a painter, and the other one makes performance, or is dancing, or whatever.
22 min 25 sec
I would say what Duras calls writing is not simply to write down some words, or to write a book. She's insisting, as I said, on a fundamental difference between writing and making literature. She invented her own concept of literature by insisting, by claiming, that what she's doing, her literature, is writing.
22 min 51 sec
What is the difference? The classical idea, or the idea of literature like we know it, for example from the history of literature of the 19th Century we know that in the classical novel, we get a kind of... The writer is developing consistent story, consistent characters. So the possibility to identify this character, and this character, that means finally to make the difference between -- I simplify of course -- the good one and the evil one, for example. Or the one with this character, and this attribute, and the other one with this attribute.
23 min 51 sec
So the idea of literature, like it is defined by Duras, of classical or traditional literature, is that the traditional writer is inventing and affirming consistencies. Personal consistencies, a consistent world, a consistent climate, a consistent plot.
24 min 16 sec
There's a kind of orientation in such a book. There's the possibility in a way to inhabit the world presented to you to orientate yourself in this world. And of course, to write a novel is so often like inventing a new world, and the world invented by classical literature like Duras is classifying or defining it is a consistent world.
24 min 51 sec
So writing in the early books of Duras are, in a way, still quite close to this. The early books, for example, "La Vie Tranquille." I don't know the English translations. "The Shameless" is the first one, and then "La Vie Tranquille" is I think the second one. OK, of course Duras, too, started with a kind of classical writing.
25 min 17 sec
But then more and more she liberated herself from this. She emancipated herself from this classical idea of literature, from making literature. And then more and more she invented her own concept of literature and the so-called writing.
25 min 38 sec
What might be the most direct definition of what she calls writing, I would say writing is stealing. Writing means to open up to the very inconsistency of the world you live in. Writing means to deal with inconsistency, and making literature means to affirm established consistencies even if you reinvent them in a different way.
26 min 4 sec
So there's an ontological break or ontological difference between these two orders: writing and making literature. And this is why Duras in many texts pointed out that writing does not mean simply to write because she is a filmmaker. Writing can simply mean "to make a film." So when she makes a film, her work as a filmmaker is the work of a writer. It means writing. And writing also means simply to orientate yourself in the world you live in.
26 min 44 sec
So writing does not necessarily mean an artistic procedure. Writing can also mean simply to orientate yourself within the pre-given reality frame. And so the experience of writing can be expressed or can be lived as the experience of love, for example. The experience of love can be lived as the experience of the non-livable parts of life. We all know this.
27 min 13 sec
There's a kind of operatic character of love -- and Duras insisted on this -- that the experience of love is the experience of the impossible. But an impossible you live, but you live it as impossibility as such. You live it as in a kind of incommensurability of your life. You live it as something that you do not control.
27 min 40 sec
So the philosophy of the whole 20th century, but the philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century. For example, the philosophy that started with Lacanian psychoanalysis in the 50s or 40s before all of it. And then I mentioned Deleuze and Derrida, the so-called French Philosophers of Difference.
28 min 15 sec
Marguerite Duras is quite close to these philosophers. Of course, she's not dealing with philosophy, and she nearly never mentioned any philosopher. She exchanged some letters with Michel Foucault, and she was very close to a French writer that you might know, Maurice Blanchot, who was born in 1907 and who died in 2003 I think. One year before Derrida.
28 min 47 sec
And these philosophers, like Derrida, like Michel Foucault, also like Gilles Deleuze, were quite influenced by this writer and political essayist -- or also in a way, philosopher -- Maurice Blanchot. If you enter the universe of Maurice Blanchot, you enter a space that you can define as a kind of ghostly space. You immediately lose ground.
29 min 19 sec
It is in a way, when I read Blanchot, many years before I read Duras. And my first idea when I read Blanchot was, "I have to relearn writing. Sorry. I have to relearn reading." Because, as I said, it's not only that a writer is inventing its own concept of writing. It is also inventing its own concept of reading, because you, the reader, are affected by this un-expectable, this, in a way, very challenging, very demanding character of the new.
30 min 11 sec
Something new is something you cannot deal with. Something new is something unexpected. Something new is something surprising.
30 min 18 sec
Something new is something uncanny. And so, in this ontological ontotopology that I started to define is this dimension of the uncanny, this dimension of the new. This is the dimension of the experience of something I'm not experienced to deal with. And Maurice Blanchot is the French writer, I would say, very close, then, to a Marguerite Duras, who invented a concept of literature that is dealing with characters that are not longer psychological characters, like, for example, in the philosophy of the 19th century.
31 min 10 sec
So, what emerges here is, of course, the very crucial question, of the whole history of philosophy, but especially of course of the philosophy after Nietzsche. With Nietzsche, and with the philosophy of the early 20th century -- let's say Heidegger, for example -- started a kind of interrogation, a very fundamental interrogation of this category of the subject.
31 min 41 sec
Does it still make sense to address the human being as a subject? Because there was a long tradition, German idealism, if you want.
31 min 51 sec
But of course, it starts, in a way, to simplify, with Rene Descartes. He was born in 1596, and he died in 1640, I think. And Rene Descartes, he addressed the human being as "ego cogito, " as a thinking substance.
32 min 16 sec
So, there was a kind of trust in the capacity of thinking, and a capacity of thinking that is a capacity of orientation, that is a capacity of the belief that is connected to the belief that the human subject is and can be the owner of its own, that there can be a kind of self-identity, between me and me, and that I'm not only, like in the tradition of Medieval philosophy before, that is defining the human subject as "ens creatum, " "of a creator". So, as an object of a creator, of a superego that is not me, that is God, of course.
33 min 8 sec
And we can say that the modern period of philosophy starts with this kind of emancipation of the subject, by addressing itself as something else than only an object, only an object of the creation of someone else, only ens creatum.
33 min 28 sec
And more and more, the philosophy developed as a philosophy of subjectivity, addressing the human subject as a subject of thinking, as a subject of self-consciousness.
33 min 44 sec
Of course, in German idealism, let's start with Kant. And the classical idea is, of course, that this subject, every one of us, as a human subject, as a singular, particular, ontic, empirical subject, everyone here is quite different from each other. But the classical philosophy of German idealism allows us to address each one in its specificity or particularity as a subject, because it makes part of a universal structure, the so-called transcendental subjectivity, a structure going on to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, modern phenomenology, of the beginning of the 20th century.
34 min 29 sec
So there is the idea. The empiric subject is a subject because it is already connected to a pre-given, universal re-subjectivity, a transcendental subjectivity. Before, of course, it was God. Now it is a kind of ontological structure. The belief is not the belief in God now. The philosophical belief is now the belief in a kind of pre-given subjectivity. Let's put it Platonic -- in a pre-given idea, in a pre-given substance: what the human subject is.
35 min 13 sec
So, in a way, there is someone who knows. There is the idea that there is a text in which it is already written what I am as a human being, as a human subject. So, my freedom and my responsibility is reduced, being nothing but, in a way, an empiric, ontic subject, connected to this pre-given, universal structure.
35 min 42 sec
And the philosophy, as I said, of the 20th century established more and more, also, mistrust concerning the idea of a universal subjectivity, a pre-given subjectivity. So, if God is dead, maybe we have to accept that we are dealing not only with a subject with subjectivity, but with a subject without subjectivity. A subject without subjectivity would be, of course, a subject of a fundamental lack, a fundamental emptiness, a fundamental lack of orientation, a fundamental lack of programmation. So there is no program.
36 min 27 sec
Of course, like I said, we are codified. Nobody of us decided to be born. Nobody of us decided to be born at that historical period, in that culture, and by these parents. So we all are objects of the circumstances we live in. We all are objects of this texture of facts.
36 min 54 sec
This is the one thing. The other thing is, is this everything? Is the human subject primordially, or is it nothing but an object of its circumstances? Is it nothing but an object? That means that there is no freedom at all. There is no freedom. If there is no freedom, there is no responsibility, because freedom is the very condition of responsibility.
37 min 22 sec
So, I would say these are two extremes. In an orthodox reading of German idealism, the classical idea of the human subject as a kind of subject that is really the owner of itself, as a subject of absolute knowledge. Of course, it's more complicated with Hegel.
37 min 43 sec
But there is this idea in Hegel, there is this idea in German idealism, that there might be a kind of ontological identity between me and me.
37 min 58 sec
And I would say, with, of course, the invention of psychoanalysis, with Freud, of course, and with the invention of the category of the unconsciousness and the unconscious, with Darwin, of course, and with Nietzsche later, and with the theory of alienation, Karl Marx. So these three crucial philosophical inventions, like the invention of unconsciousness by Freud, the theory of alienation by Marx, and the theory of evolution by Charles Darwin, these three inventions can be read, of course -- and I'm not the only one saying this, of course -- as kind of narcissistic pleasures, concerning the self-addressing of the human subject as a subject that is the owner of its own.
38 min 58 sec
So, there might be a kind of gap between me and me. And I would say the philosophy of the second half of the 20th century, so-called, or a huge part of the continental philosophy, is turning around this gap. And this gap, for example, Derrida is mentioning or marking or indicating this gap, or this difference, as the "diffrance", written with an A, and spatialization. And spatialization simply means there is a room between me and me.
39 min 42 sec
There is something between me and me. So there is a kind of gap between me and me. I'm not one-to-one identical with myself.
39 min 53 sec
And of course, this gap is the very condition of freedom. So it's not a kind of pessimistic theory of non-identity. It has nothing to do with a kind of pessimistic. It's not a tragic paradigm or something like this. But it's simply insisting, if I'm not identical with myself, there remains something to do. There remains something to live. There is some air to breathe, in a way. So, if I would be one-to-one identical with myself, I would be dead. I would be like a stone.
40 min 31 sec
But, if there is a capacity of thinking, if I am more than an object, then I'm a subject that experiences itself as a subject of this gap. So there's no reason to give up this idea, like it was done, of course, by these philosophers that I mentioned. Also, by Derrida. Derrida doesn't continue using the word "subject," and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari the same.
41 min 4 sec
There is a kind of, in a way, fear concerning this category of the subject. And I understand quite well why, because what they are refusing, of course, is the idealistic, or the metaphysical, let's say, notion of the subject as a sovereign, as a self-transparency subject. But this subject, of course, never existed. Not in Hegel and not before. It exists as a kind of orthodox philosophical illusion or phantasm.
41 min 42 sec
But I would say, going through this period of, let's say, deconstruction of the subject, it makes sense to reaffirm this category of the subject as the scene of a permanent self- destabilization. So the subject is nothing but the scene of a permanent self-deconstruction, self-destabilization. It is the scene in which each one of us has to deal with the incommensurable parts of its own life, of its own reality, of him or herself.
42 min 20 sec
So, this incommensurability I spoke about at the beginning, or the inconsistency, is nothing but this gap, this gap between me and me- -this gap not only concerning the ontological character of me as human subject, whatever means human, but also of the reality I live in.
42 min 42 sec
So there is a novel you maybe know. This is one of my favorites of Duras, and it's "Emily L." It's a small novel she published in the '80s, and it's a kind of homage to Emily Dickenson. And "Emily L", in this story--it's a complex story. Don't tell the story, but there's an important passage in this book. And Emily L. is writing a poem, and this poem is dealing with, how it is said, the inner difference of meaning. The inner difference of meaning. And if I understand well, what here is called the inner differences of meaning is precisely this implicit inconsistency of the so-called reality.
43 min 43 sec
So, what Emily does -- and this is, of course, the condition of writing this poem -- she looked for one second, I don't know, in the atlas of the world. And the atlas of the world, it's not the mythological Oracles or something. It's not as prophetic. It's simply the incommensurability of reality as such. So reality is not as commensurable, is not as controllable, is not as knowable, is not as certain, is not as, in a way, familiar, than supposed.
44 min 24 sec
So, as I said, there is no second world, but there is this one world without exit. There is this one reality without exit. But there is the very truth of reality. Let's call it truth. But truth is not something existing. Truth is not something given. Truth is simply the name.
44 min 43 sec
This is how I define truth now. Truth is not something you can find. It's not there or there, or behind me, or I don't know, in the sky, like the sky of ideas in Plato or something. Truth is not something already existing. Truth is simply something you can experience as the inconsistency of the world you live in and the inconsistency, then, of course, of yourself, as the subject, as an inhabitant of this world, as an inhabitant of a world without alternatives, as an inhabitant of a world that is much, much less familiar than supposed.
45 min 28 sec
This is, for me, the crucial philosophical claim of the work of Duras, that she insists on her work as a writer as this kind of blind dynamics towards the blind spot of reality. There's kind of like a black sun. You can already find that in Plato, when Plato, in the "Politeia", for example, insisted not only on the difference between let's call it the simple shadows or phenomenons, and then you have the ideas of these phenomenons, and not only existing on the difference between, like Kant would later put it, phenomenon and noumenon.
46 min 21 sec
But there is a third instance in Plato, and this is what he calls the beyond of being. It is, of course, the highest idea, the idea of the ideas. It's also God, in a way. But God is presented as "epekeina tes ousias, " as beyond being. So, that means, and it is connected to the image of the sun, or to the metaphor, if you want, or allegory, of the sun. But this is a black sun, of course. You do not look directly in the sun without immediately being blinded. And I would say this is the blind spot. This is another image, or another metaphor, for what I would call inconsistency or incommensurability.
47 min 11 sec
And this is the philosophy of engagement of the work of Duras. And this is why she cannot simply accept making literature, inscribing herself in an already existing field, already existing notion or concept of literature, because -- and this is why she was aggressed by so many people, of course. There were so many people, also, offending her for her way of writing, of course, or making films, because it was something unsupportable. Of course, she had, also, a lot of fans, more and more. And when she published "The Lover" she became a writer, also, for a huge, huge public and translated in more than 50 languages. But it was a long way. Anyhow, that is not the goal.
48 min 10 sec
The important thing, I think, is that Duras, from the very beginning, experienced literature, her work, her writing, as something that goes beyond the classic concept of making literature. And sometimes people call that the mystical part of her work. And I don't like this work so much, because it's not about obscurantism. So I would say everything that counts, in art, in philosophy, in life, in writing, of course, is a fight against obscurantism.
48 min 57 sec
So only bad art is fleeing in obscurantism. It's fleeing in the kind of mystical esoterism, esoterics or something like this. But this is not the question so I would insist on the difference that seems important for me concerning these three ways of touching the untouchable or contacting the abyss of the reality system.
49 min 31 sec
Art, philosophy and writing in the sense of Duras and there's a difference between comprehensibility and clarity. And as a philosopher for example, this is my everyday experience, since twenty years nearly. That as a philosopher, you nearly always have to defend yourself making philosophy. The people, they say, yeah, but philosophy is something over complicated and why are the texts so complicated? And I don't understand. And, I don't understand so, that's why you are the ideal, you, the philosopher, like Bukht once claimed.
50 min 17 sec
And I don't know one philosopher in the whole history of philosophy that is overcomplicated. They are complicated to text, a lot of text. Spinoza is very complicated, I would say, the ethics. And Derrida, sometimes and Heidegger of course, and Donnadieu also.
50 min 35 sec
OK. But what is with contemporary art is it less complicated? And I would say that is not the problem, that something, our world is complicated. It's that we don't overview reality, we don't overview our life, but we have to live nevertheless. We have to decide nevertheless. We have to live nevertheless within this reality field, that is in the way too much. You don't overview the totality of your life, but you are not the owner of the situation you live in, but you have to make decisions.
51 min 11 sec
You have to make choices and sometime you really have to make a decision. A decision that something else than a choice. A choice is simply choosing between alternatives within this reality field, tea or coffee, for example. But to make a choice is simply in a way affirming reality as the system of giving alternatives and options by making a choice between alternatives, but choosing an alternative or choosing an option.
51 min 38 sec
But the decision in writing of course in the sense of Duras is much more inside of decision. Decision, 'decision' the Latin word is to cut, cut that is in a way to break up or to break up with this established reality field and to invent something new. Like I said, that means to break up with this field because and to refuse this kind of fundamental trust for a moment and to say no. The decision is, in a way, dealing, is voting for impossibility as such.
52 min 12 sec
And a choice is choosing between possibilities or alternatives in that sense. But I would say this dynamics of writing, this dynamics of philosophy, this dynamics of something else, the known in academic procedure is quite close to the dynamics of life. And so I would say philosophy, art, and writing in the sense of Duras are three modalities or modes of simply living, of being alive. Of being alive and being alive does not mean simply to exist like a stone, as a human being, as a human subject.
52 min 55 sec
It means in a way to take responsibility, but it is responsibility that cannot orientate itself in a pre-given, moralistic or religious system. There is no book you can look inside and then you find solution for the problem you have. If you have a problem, you have a problem that you have to solve alone.
53 min 26 sec
And Maurice Blanchot invented one concept that seems for me close to the experience of writing in the sense of Marguerite Duras and she quite often insists on literally pathetic. It sounds pathetic, but in a way, it's nothing but the everyday experience of every philosopher, every writer and every artists and maybe of everyone of us. The experience of loneliness and she says essential loneliness. 'Solitude Essentiale', and live on more complicated on his sense but to take this term, the experience of 'Solitude Essentiale' is simply the experience of a subject that started to discover that it has to do it alone.
54 min 20 sec
It has to live it's life without having a kind of guaranteed measure. There ought to be no inner voice. There is no voice in the outside that tells you what to do and what is right and wrong. This is the experience of a difference of meaning like it is called by Duras in Emily L. It is the breakdown of meaning, as such. Meaning is simply something, a kind of fragile architecture of both this general universal abyss, that is the abyss of cowards, the abyss of incommensurability.
55 min 12 sec
So, maybe you might remember that Nietzsche once spoke, "[indecipherable 55:15]". No, no. It's in another text, and he spokes about this experience of the world detached from its sun and this is the experience of the breakdown of reality. So because the sun had the pre-size function as the kind of transcendental signature... Sorry. To guarantee and to stabilize into ontologically the meaning of this reality system of the world.
55 min 47 sec
But if the world is detached from this superior authority, because this superior authority does not exists or only exists as a kind of blind or black son, or something that cannot help you concerning the orientation in your world and in your life, then you recognize yourself as a subject of this, let's say essential solitude.
56 min 22 sec
So there are some topics that, I don't want to speak too long, but there are some topics in the work of Duras that you might know, for example the topic of the sea. So often in the writings, but also in the film "L'Homme atlantique" for example the topic of the seas, you know that she grew up in Vietnam in to China and then the experience of the water and the experience of the sea. The experience of the kind of fluidity is of course, the experience of something that is much more controlling me, than I'm controlling it, this element or this dimension.
57 min 5 sec
So I would say that the appearance and this dimension of the sea in the work of Duras is the appearance of the dimension of incommensurability or the uncontrollable and it is very close to another topic, that in French the sea of course is "la mer" and the mother is "la mre". So, not easy to go to remark difference only by hearing but la mer and la mre, the sea and the mother is one of the crucial topics of the works of Duras.
57 min 48 sec
And the mother is in a way a kind of monster. The mother is indicating the dimension of monstrosity. Why? Because the mother is already there and then, for me as a kid and the mother is always the kind of... In a way she is representing the dimension of infinitude, but not religious infinitude, not eternity in that sense. But the kind of infinitude that has a very violent effect on the kids. So the mother does not appear on this a little bit sentimental and idea and loving her kids and doing everything for them and so on.
58 min 36 sec
And in the work of Duras un barrage contre le Pacifique, the mother is fighting to... How do I say? To get a permission and [indecipherable 58:54]. She buys a permission to cultivate some rice and of course for the kids and she has another topic. The two brothers, the younger brother and the older brother. The younger that she loves so much and the older one that represents himself also kind of violent in some time.
59 min 14 sec
But the mother is very close to the older brother, to the violent older brother and so, the separation, the family system and the father died when Marguerite was very young. The real name of Marguerite was Marguerite Donnadieu and she take this name Marguerite Duras. But the dimension the mother and the dimension of the older brother represents, I would say, also a kind of incommensurability for the little kids.
59 min 49 sec
Being unable for the little brother or being unable to defend himself against the violence of the older brother. And being and also for little Marguerite being unable to defend herself against the violence of her mother beating her sometimes and so on.
1 hr 7 sec
It would be necessary to discuss more close to the text and I just want to insist on the fact that the topic of incommensurability and the topic of the uncontrollable can be the topic of the mother. Can be the topic of the sea, can me the topic of meaningless within each meaning.
1 hr 34 sec
And there's this great other novel, "Le Ravissement De Lol V. Stein", "The Ravishing" I think in English, "of Lol V. Stein" that is from '64 if I remember well. And in this novel, 20 years before "Emily L." published and written before "Emily L". There appears another formulation that seems for me being close to this inner difference of meaning and this is what Marguerite Duras calls the monde entier, the whole world.
1 hr 1 min 25 sec
And so, imagine a world that is like a hole, and imagine that is a dangerous world because in a way it marks the inconsistency of all other worlds. So again, the inconsistency of also meaning, the inconsistency of communication, the inconsistency finally of the subject of communication, the inconsistency of the subject without subjectivity. The inconsistency of the subject without subjectivity is a subject of the kind of ontological emptiness.
1 hr 2 min 1 sec
So, you have attributes. You can be identified in this world as Marguerite or as the brother or mother. But what seems to be more important is that your real identity is something hat is transgressing your identical being within this existing relative field. This is something I would say [indecipherable 1:02:34] always insisting on and this is again why she is so close to Maurice Blanchot. Because finally the subject without subjectivity is a kind of ghostly subject.
1 hr 2 min 40 sec
What is a ghost if not something that is there without being there? That is present in the mode of absence. So a ghost is something not graspable. A ghost is something you do not control. So at the moment it is here and then it disappeared. So, the disappearance is the ontological models of being of a ghost, of a ghostly being.
1 hr 3 min 13 sec
And I would say the characters are more and more Duras is inventing in her writings are such ghostly characters -- not graspable, not controllable, in a way face and nameless. She is using this words face and nameless because the face and the name is something we need to recognize, to identify the other. But there's also, of course, the idea of the radical otherness of the other. So radical that it is something beyond its established identity in the social field, in the symbolic order.
1 hr 4 min 2 sec
And this is again, the experience of the inconsistency of the subject as a ghostly subject. As a subject that is not... That has no, without substance in a way.
1 hr 4 min 25 sec
So let me -- we can discuss it together. Why Marguerite Duras? Why especially for me, let me start with and end with a personal statement. So, because I think philosophy is precisely this.
1 hr 4 min 45 sec
Dealing with the ghostly part of reality, dealing with the ghostly part of the human subject.
1 hr 4 min 52 sec
Accepting the non-liberal parts of life. Confronting incommensurability as very truth of reality, as were truth of my life, as very truth of human subject and then accepting this kind of essential solitude as a very character of human subject life. OK. I stop here and maybe we can discuss it.
1 hr 5 min 33 sec
[applause] Man 1: There's a book by Kierkegaard that we know in English is "Sickness Unto Death" and I think the title in French is "La maladie de la mort" or "La maladie ala mort". I'm specifically curator guardian idea that there was maladie de la mort that we should think about? Marcus: In fact, I don't know if she refers in an explicit way to Kierkegaard. I don't remember having read this and I don't... I would say there is no explicit, but of course I'm sure she made in implicit reference. Maladie de la mort as the malady... The sickness of being unable to love in this text. How defining such a text maladie de la mort was such a special and specific text again. I would say this is a text. Is it a novel? It's like the same with Maurice Blanchot when Derrida's cast this in his writings in Blanchot. [indecipherable 1:06:58] is the right word for...
1 hr 7 min 3 sec
But I don't know about in explicit reference. But you would like to make this reference? Man 1: I don't know the Kierkegaard book well enough to talk about it. I guess I'm asking [inaudible 1:07:26] .
1 hr 7 min 21 sec
Marcus: Yeah. But my impression was more implicit reference but I would be unable now that it would be to construct. I would have to construct a reference that actually I don't believe in.
1 hr 7 min 41 sec
Woman 1: I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about this idea of community of loneliness or of alienation that Yang talks about in her work and also that Derrida writes about and the Politics of Friendship of friends we have. There are no friends and this idea like calling forward for sort of friends in this alienation, I guess. I'd like to hear you talk about that.
1 hr 8 min 26 sec
Marcus: Yeah. First I would say, I would remember to you that this topic of community became such a huge, huge important after, I would say in the way, after '89, after the breakdown of Soviet Union and so on.
1 hr 8 min 44 sec
But of course there's a philosophical impact, not only a political. But there's both a philosophical and the political impact concerning this idea of community. Like I said in the lecture, the classic idea is how to define the togetherness of each singular subject, each singular human being. And the classic idea is, there's a kind of universal community. The community of all these subjects that share this connection, this pre-given connection to pre-given transcendental substance or quality humanity, quality of belief that humanity as such exists.
1 hr 9 min 32 sec
And then I would say with the interrogation, of course, out in the history of philosophy of the 20th century, especially after Nietzsche, and with Nietzsche with the interrogation of the character of the human subject with exploring in the way the emptiness and the inconsistency of the human subject.
1 hr 9 min 53 sec
Then, of course, the question gets kind of urgency to ask you, yeah, but how to imagine or how to define a community of ghosts in a way, a community of subjects without subjectivity. It's a kind of community of subjects that does not substantially share anything.
1 hr 10 min 21 sec
For example, you can say in the classical political perspective, of course, you say someone who is from the States and who inhabits the States just with someone other who inhabits the States, these inhabitants. OK, but what is the substance? Is there a kind of substance or, like I called it, ontological criterion that finally would constitute the fundament for this community? This is, I think, the question of Maurice Blanchot and very different -- Jean Luc Nancy. Like, you know, maybe a philosopher today who is interrogating, who is dealing with this question of community. But it is a community of a subject that is not guaranteed by a pre-given ground, by a pre-given idea, by a pre- given concept. In that sense it is a community. I don't know how Haegue is using this word, but I know that she's close also to Duras and Blanchot. And I would say the community of absence is a community of the absence of a transcendental substance or of a transcendental program.
1 hr 11 min 59 sec
So the absence, what I call subject without subjectivity, this without marks precisely this absence. So the subject without subjectivity is the subject of absence in the sense I would put it.
1 hr 12 min 16 sec
And this is the situation that I would say we are dealing with in contemporary philosophy. Different philosophers, Esposito in Italy, there are different philosophers dealing with this question. How to think in a way...
1 hr 12 min 34 sec
Let's say humanity, by accepting first that humanity as such does not exist. How thinking, how giving, that's one of the oldest philosopher questions. What is a human being? And this human being, how is it inhabiting its world? What is it, its world? So these two questions that I try to speak about in the lecture is that, we have two, the experience of two destabilizations.
1 hr 13 min 20 sec
And the first destabilization is that this originally destabilized human subject does not exist. It is a kind of a lost subject also. And then reality, for example if Lacan claimed Lacan [indecipherable 1:13:45], the "big other", that is his name for the symbolic order, does not exist. Does not exist simply means there is an absence; there is an inconsistency.
1 hr 14 min
Of course there is reality and of course it makes sense, as I said in the beginning. It makes sense to speak about a kind of social universe we live in. And there are some established laws and rules.
1 hr 14 min 17 sec
And of course, all of this works in a way. It is the dimension of function. It is the dimension in which of the livable in a way.
1 hr 14 min 33 sec
But of course, what philosophy and art and writing are to interrogate the consistency of this universe. And then you make the experience. And then you see what Duras in a way, pointed out in her way, that there is no stabilization. There is no orientation.
1 hr 14 min 59 sec
There is no absolute orientation. You know, there is some orientation, but there is no absolute orientation. There is no absolute guarantee.
1 hr 15 min 6 sec
Duras didn't like Sartre so much. And there was in Paris between the intellectuals, it's a very special thing and a lot of enemies.
1 hr 15 min 23 sec
But I personally, Sartre is not a philosopher -- contemporary philosophy not so much philosophers are referring to Sartre. But what seems to me very important concerning Sartre is that Sartre was the one, maybe you know the famous claim, that he said "l' existence preced l'essence". First you existence and then you have to invent your own essence. And the essence for humanity as such.
1 hr 15 min 56 sec
So the classical idea was, of course, first essence, then existence. So first, there is in a way a mastermind, call it God.
1 hr 16 min 5 sec
And he has a plan in his mind, or her mind, I don't know, but in the mind. And there is a plan, there is an idea what the human being as human being is. And then after this plan, like an architect is doing, first the plan then the complete house.
1 hr 16 min 22 sec
But Sartre said, first you are in the world, like thrown in the world, with Heidegger or not. And then you have to invent your own essence. It's up to you. And this hyperbolic idea or this idea of a hyperbolic responsibility. Responsibility in the sense of Sartre is not a moralistic thing. In a way, it's something, you are confronted with something that in a way is so surpassing your own capacities because you are responsible for something you do not control.
1 hr 17 min 2 sec
And this is of course responsibility only exists as a kind of excess. To be responsible, does not mean just like I said when choosing. It is not to orient yourself to a given moralistic register, do you say, on ethics or something. No, but it simply means to take the responsibility simply means, to take the responsibility as such a subject of fundamental solitude. That means there is no such of register. And you have to make your decisions, nevertheless. And you have to take your reasonability, nevertheless.
1 hr 17 min 41 sec
This is why I don't only insist on the ghostly character of the subject, but also, I like the world insisting in my writings, there is much on this in the world of blindness. I believe in blindness.
1 hr 17 min 56 sec
I believe in helplessness. I believe that art and philosophy, and it is not simply kind of a critical procedure developing knowledge out of knowledge. Show me one artist who or her generated knowledge out of knowledge.
1 hr 18 min 12 sec
I am not saying there is nothing to know. But there is so much knowledge, so much information. We live in this time of over communication, over information. Sometimes you have the idea there's so much hardware, but where's the software? You can communicate more and more, and you have better modes of communication, better iPhones. I don't know. "What are you communicating?" That's sometimes the question I would have for some 12, 13 years old kids in the bus. "I see you like to communicate, but what is it about?" This is not a moralistic thing, but I think now we have this kind of empty communication. The thing is not what you communicate, but as long as you communicate you are in the game.
1 hr 19 min 6 sec
Philosophy is to interrupt. To stop with this for one second, with this kind of craziness of communication. But not with a kind of moralistic claim, but not on insisting, don't believe in communication and knowledge and information. These make part of the same order, I would say.
1 hr 19 min 32 sec
For example, Duras' writing, it's like a platitude. Everyone knows this platitude of someone who has to write a text and then you have this white paper, and you don't know if you are a writer or not.
1 hr 19 min 50 sec
Then you have this 'Hora Vacuui' of this white paper and you have to fulfill it, and you are lost. You are lost. This is an experience that I think every artist, every philosopher, always do.
1 hr 20 min 6 sec
We will continue doing it until we are doing what we are doing. But it's not a disaster, it simply means to restart every time, and to confront the very emptiness of your situation, and to confront also your own impotence, sometimes. To do it. To write, of course, means to deal with your weakness, with the fundamental weakness that makes part of everyone, if you are a writer or not. It's not a privilege of the writers to be weak, or artists, or philosophers.
1 hr 20 min 43 sec
But it's simply to confront your weakness, to affirm it as the very condition of creation.
1 hr 20 min 52 sec
I believe in creation, in creation that finds its starting point in the confrontation of this fundamental emptiness.
1 hr 21 min 6 sec
Woman 2: Can you say a little bit more about what you talked about, Le Motu, and how for Duras it kind of... Do you see any change between her very first books and the very last that she wrote? What form did it take, and what kind of ghosts inhabit this whole, across her work? Marcus: First, Le Motu is like a formula, or formulation, that appears in Lol V. Stein. But of course it's not explained, and it's not really developed. So you have to deal, yourself, with this, with the meaning of this destruction of meaning. But what I understood is I still do not feel as an expert on the work of Duras. In a way, for me it would seem like a contradiction to be an expert of such a work, because it's not really controllable, not by me. I simply can tell you what I understood, and how I understood this formulation, Motu.
1 hr 22 min 43 sec
Of course, for example, she lived also, when she wasn't in Paris, she had this room in this Roches Noires Hotel. This is in Trouville. And this was sometimes pointed out, that she liked to live in Trouville, in the City of the Hole, if you want. So in a way I think we understand. Maybe we don't understand what really she wanted to say, but I would say it's simply the courage. She's a very courageous author like I experience her.
1 hr 23 min 23 sec
And I would say the courage of the confrontation of emptiness, of the whole, of destabilization. What is the counter word of "the Hole?" How do you say something complete or...
1 hr 23 min 41 sec
Man 2: Whole. Marcus: Whole, yes. Le tout.
1 hr 23 min 47 sec
Man 2: W-H-O-L-E. Marcus: Yes.
1 hr 23 min 51 sec
Man 2: As opposed to H-O-L-E? Marcus: The "tout". Yeah. Yeah.
1 hr 24 min 1 sec
Woman: It works in French, but it doesn't work in English. Marcus: The counter word to "le tout"? Maybe I don't have the word, but I would say it's a phantasm of completeness. It's the phantasm of identity. Like I said, the phantasm of being one-to-one identical with myself. So then there is no hole. Then there is no gap. Then there is no difference. But as long as there's a difference, there's the feel of difference. There's a feel of a hole. There's a feel of the abyss. What I call the lack of orientation is the experience of someone of a subject that is a subject of such an experience of a universal tout. So it's not simply the perforation in the table, you know? Of course not. I would say you know that tradition in the matter of physics or tradition of philosophy -- so much dealing with the phantasm of fundament.
1 hr 25 min 5 sec
Fundamentum inconcussum -- that's in Latin how Descartes described the ego cogito, the human subject. He wanted to install, to stabilize the human subject, the res cogitans, a thinking thing as a fundamentum inconcussum as a fundament for a house, a fundament for an architecture. First you need a fundament. You need a stable ground. And then you can build up, I don't know, a whole castle.
1 hr 25 min 44 sec
But a castle built up on sand, or how do you say? It's not stabilized, so it has no endurance in the time, if you want. And philosophy is so much our tradition, I would say. The European tradition of continental philosophy is so much dealing with these words of the fundament and the ground and the stable ground. Also in Kant, of course, and the "Boden" in German you say.
1 hr 26 min 24 sec
And also Kant is, for example, in "The Critique of Pure Reason" he's using this word of architecture, but it's the architecture of thoughts. So the idea is you have these two ideas, you know, for example mentioned by Deleuze, of course, "La Arbor". How do you say? "The Tree." The tree is stabilized in the ground by the racines and so on. And then it's developing a kind of structure, and you have a kind of hierarchy in the architecture of the tree.
1 hr 26 min 58 sec
And of course, there's also the allegory of the house and the fundament and so on. And I would say that modern thinking -- the philosophy of modernity in continental thinking -- started with this idea that it is possible to find such a fundament and to stabilize the human subject on a stable ground.
1 hr 27 min 22 sec
And I would say Duras, without being a philosopher, I present her here as a philosopher -- but as a philosopher that of course does not want to be a philosopher. And that she, with this topic of the whole, is of course referring on this tradition, on these phantasms finally, that it might be able to guarantee and to stabilize the human subject on a stable ground philosophically or however.
1 hr 28 min
Woman: Well, thank you very much [inaudible 1:28:11] .

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